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L'abstrait
Ceci est un papier de recherche de maîtrise en science économiques sur le sujet d'estimation 
des préférences avec les modèles de choix discrets. Le travail du lauréat Nobel Daniel 
McFadden sur les modèles logit est adapté dans le model d'utilité aléatoire. Ce model permet 
une perspective intéressante sur la théorie des préférences et de la transitivité, tel que avancé 
par  Amos Tversky, parmi d'autres. La grande partie de ce papier de recherche s'inspire de 
l'article de Regenwetter et co-auteurs, "Transitivity of preferences" (2011). Les donnes d'un 
sondage mené en 2011 par Regenwetter et co-auteurs sont utilises ici afin de faire de 
l'inférence sur le model et estimer des utilités, qui sont ensuite ordonnés de manière de 
construire des relations de préférence. Une discussion sur les préférences, les modèles logit et 
ses estimations parait dans ce papier. Ce travail a été fait sous la supervision de professeur 
William McCausland, Université du Montréal, Quebec.
Abstract
This work is a masters research paper in economics on the topic of estimating preferences with 
discrete choice models. The work of Nobel laureate Daniel McFadden on logit models was 
adapted into a model on random utility. This model allows for an interesting perspective on the 
theory of preferences and transitivity as conjectured by Amos Tversky, among others. The bulk 
of this research paper draws from the article by Regenwetter and co-authors "Transitivity of 
preferences" (2011). His data from the 2011 survey was used to run inference on the model and 
estimate utilities, which then allowed to construct and analyze preference relations. A discussion 
on preferences, logit models and estimation is featured in this paper. The work was done under 
supervision of professor William McCausland, Universite du Montreal, Quebec. 
INTRODUCTION
This work is a masters research paper on the topic of estimating preferences with 
discrete choice models. The focus of this work is to motivate and build an empirical 
model capable of estimating preference relations in a stochastic environment. By using 
the assumptions of the logit model with respect to estimating discrete choice sets, the 
model will use the power of the logit model for the purpose of estimating utilities of 
individuals. The paper will feature discussion on both theory of preferences and 
inference work. 
The paper combines theory of preferences and random utility. The first section will 
review the theory on preferences and transitivities in dynamic and stochastic 
environment. Starting with Amos Tversky's seminal paper "Intransitivity of preferences", 
which has seriously shaken the axioms of rational choice and spurred a lot of research 
on the subject of choice, rationality and transitivity, this section will discuss the more 
recent developments in that area, such as the critique of Regenwetter and co-authors 
on the faults of existing models. 
The next sections will discuss choice modelling. The paper will explain the basics of 
discrete choice models, the logit model and the contribution of Nobel laureate Daniel 
McFadden to the theory. The paper will then use his econometrics work to build two 
empirical models; the first is a random utility model and the second is a logit model that 
supposes a context effect in the utility of individuals. The first model assumes utility is 
composed strictly of an error term that has a logit distribution. The second model 
assumes the utility is in part determined by the context, that is what choices the 
individual is asked to rank. 
Furthermore, the paper will present and analyze the results that have been obtained by 
carrying inference with the aid of the two logit models. All programming was done in R 
language and all the data was taken from the survey conducted by Regenwetter and co 
authors in 2011. This model will shed a little light on some conjunctures about cyclicities 
but unfortunately no definite conclusion can be reached.
Finally, this paper will suggest few ideas for future work. One of such ideas is improving 
estimation techniques through a better experimental design and surveying methods. 
One modest experimental design will be proposed but a thorough discussion on the 
topic is beyond the scope of this paper. 
THEORY
This section will briefly cover the theory of transitivity in choice preferences. Transitivity 
is a crucial axiom in rational choice. Increasingly, researchers challenge the notion of 
transitivity in preferences. The following section will explain what is transitivity and why 
transitivity is important, why researchers overestimate cases of transitivity and the 
difficulties related to uncovering transitivity in general. It will be important to understand 
the difference between preferences in a stochastic and deterministic environment. This 
section centers around the theory in Tversky's 1969 paper and the subsequent critique. 
The following section is a literature review; it introduces the concepts and the notions 
before dwelling into the somewhat more technical aspects of choice modelling. 
Rationality and transitivity
Rational choice is a very vast and complicated idea. Economists think of rational 
individuals as having a preference relation over choices. Every choice, for example the 
choice of a car, yields a utility to the chooser, which in turn can be ranked. The choice 
yielding the highest utility is said to be most preferred, the choice with the second 
highest utility is second most preferred and so on. Preference relations are crucial as 
much of the theory of micro economics rests on the idea that rational agents are looking 
to make the best possible decision. The theory of preference rests on four principal 
axioms : the preferences are 1) transitive, 2) complete, 3) continuous and 4) 
independent. The first axiom is also perhaps the most crucial and will be thoroughly 
discussed in this paper. 
Preferences are defined as relations over objects and the objects could be either 
tangible or decisions like "watching a movie". In a set of three possible objects {A,B,C}, 
we say an individual n can rank the three in order based on what he prefers most to 
what he prefers least, for example  (A>nB>nC), where A is preferred to B, B is preferred 
to C and A is preferred to C. The >n (or <n) is a preference operator and denotes an 
object being preferred to another object according to individual n. When obvious from 
the context, notation n will be dropped from the operator and preferences are denoted 
by simply > or < signs. 
Transitivity is a fundamental axiom of rational choice. Formally, we define transitivity as: 
if (A>B) and (B>C) then it must be that (A>C). If choices are not transitive then it is said 
that they are intransitive. For example, if an individual prefers A over B and B over C but 
then prefers C over A, we say she violates the transitivity axiom on preferences. This 
kind of violation contradicts the notion of rationality and it challenges the definition of 
preferences as we understand it.
Tversky has shown that given particular objects, individuals would, knowingly or not, 
exhibit preferences that violate this axiom of transitivity. These type of preferences are 
different from what is hypothesised under classic theory. Termed lexicographic 
semiorder preferences, they satisfy the definition of transitivity in theory; however in 
practice it is possible to manipulate the attributes of a choice set such that preferences 
contain intransitivities. His results spurred a lot of research on rationality, utility, 
preferences and transitivity. Today this is a very popular research topic in many 
disciplines and there even exist a number of research centers that study related 
questions, for example the Center for the Study of Rationality in Jerusalem, Israel and 
the Center for the Study of Choice in Sydney, Australia. In other fields like biology and 
neurology, animal brains are tested to determine if rats and birds are capable to 
calculate expected probability of an event (Glimcher and Rustichni 2004). 
Tversky model 
The model was originally conceived by psychologist Amos Tversky in 1969. The model 
was a major contribution to the study of rationality and choice, the understanding of 
preferences and the discipline of economics in general. The set up will be explained in 
this section because the rest of this paper will use the same concepts and definitions.  
Tversky conducted a survey among 18 Harvard undergraduate students. Each student 
was asked to answer a series of questions about his preferences. Every question would 
present the student with two alternatives and ask him to select one that he likes best. 
The alternatives are objects called a "lottery" because each object has a probability of 
realization (between 0 and 1) and an outcome (winnings of a lottery) in real U.S. dollars. 
Intuitively it is possible to calculate an expected value (e.g E(x)=probability of winning * 
value of prize x) of each lottery but this calculation was not provided nor encouraged. 
There are a total of 5 lotteries, {A,B,C,D,E} which is a global (or master) choice set. The 
lotteries will be also called alternatives, objects and items throughout the paper when 
obvious from the context. A set of alternatives from which an individual was asked to 
choose is called a "choice set". For the purpose of his survey, the choice set has two 
items because in each question the individual was tasked to choose one of two choices; 
effectively, the individual is making a series of pairwise comparisons over all the ten 
possible ways to construct two-choice object set when the master set contains 5 items. 
When an alternative has been chosen, it will be referred to as a "choice".
The purpose of the survey is to learn about each individual's preferences. Each question 
asks an individual to choose between two alternatives. Indifference and non-response 
are not allowed. Because there are ten possible choice sets with two elements, an 
individual is asked a total of ten questions and each of the ten questions is repeated 
twenty times to measure consistency. Plus there are also filler questions asked in the 
middle of the test to mitigate memory effects, statistical dependencies and otherwise to 
make sure the real questions are properly administered, but these filler questions are 
not recorded for the experiment. From observing an individual's answer, it will be 
possible to discover how she feels about each of the five items {A,B,C,D,E}. 
The nature of the test necessitates a stochastic environment so the first thing that was 
necessary is to introduce a new model to measure behaviour in probabilistic fashion. 
Formally, object i is said to be weakly stochastically preferred over object j if the 
probability of choosing i in a set {i,j} is equal to or greater than 1/2, or . In 
turn, transitivity is defined as weak stochastic transitivity where : if  and 
 then . A higher probability here is tied to the idea of 
constituency. Individuals that are very consistent in their choice will have a probability 
approaching 1 (e.g. they behave deterministically). 
By conducting the experiment, Tversky has shown that not only do individuals violate 
the idea of transitivity as we know it but in predictable ways. According to the results of 
the survey, the majority of individuals violated transitivity in their own preferences. 
These results were very surprising, including to the respondents themselves who denied 
at first acting intransitively. This kind of behaviour challenges the notion of preferences 
as we understand them. 
The major contribution of his paper is the introduction of a Lexicographic Semiordering 
type of preferences which he says individuals occasionally exhibit when faced with 
particular attributes. 
The Lexicographic Semiordering is formally defined as: A > B if and only if (a > b) or (a = 
b and a' ≥ b'), where (a,a') are respectively the first and second attributes of object A 
and (b,b') are respectively the first and second attributes of object B. In other words, the 
first attribute is the most important for an individual's choice. Only when an individual is 
indifferent or undecided between two alternatives based on the first attribute will she use 
the second attribute to judge between the objects A,B. An example of a lexicographic 
semiorder in practice is the system by which a dictionary is composed. 
Ranking based on LS preferences does not violate transitivity on its own. Rather, it is 
the perception of an individual that can be manipulated so to force transitivities in 
choices. If the difference between the first attribute of two objects (a and b) is minimal, 
the individual will make the decision based on the 2nd attribute (a',b'). When difference 
of (a,b) is large again, the individual will make the decision based on the first attribute. 
This type of decision making can generate intransitivities in preferences. 
Regenwetter et co crit ique
Regenwetter, Dana and Davis-Stober discussed at length the issues with literature on 
transitivity and the faults with Tversky's model and a number of others (Regenwetter and 
co 2011). The main component of their paper is that the literature overestimates cases 
of transitivity due to faulty statistical analysis and bad model specification. 
The central remark is how researchers are so far unable to reconcile a dynamic model 
with a static model. The classic theory on preferences is defined in a static environment 
whereas empirical testing is set in a stochastic environment. Unfortunately, most 
dynamic models are not adequate enough to estimate preferences in dynamic 
environments. Indeed, most of the models have one common shortcoming, namely the 
inability to distinguish between variability and consistency.   
It is impossible to know the difference between variability and consistency in individual's 
choices. When an individual answers a question 20 times, half of those times she might 
be in a state of mind where she prefers A and the other half he might be in a state of 
mind where she prefers B. This kind of variability is an observed phenomenon in real life 
and thus expected on the part of respondents as well. 
By using tricks to mitigate for memory effects, the researchers hope to control for 
different transitive states but this does not usually work. Therefore, when a respondent 
is repeated the same question and she answers it differently, she may in fact be 
expressing variability which is a result of being in a different mental state. This type of 
behaviour is both natural and anticipated. However, as the researcher cannot observe 
what transitive state she is, he considers it part of the same preference relation. He 
assumes that the difference in answers is due to a lack of consistency by the 
respondent, which is not necessarily true. The models on stochastic preferences is 
laden with these problems and more. Ignoring it leads to faulty estimation of 
preferences.  
Further criticism by Ragenwetter is how researchers do not focus on all cases of 
cyclicities. A single respondent has multiple preference relationships and thus multiple 
ways to break the cycle. Most researchers will assume there is but one preference 
relationship, so they do not focus on other cases of transitivity (or lack thereof) that 
might be happening. 
Furthermore, there s a problem with Type1 errors. Type1 error is defined as rejecting a 
hypothesis that should have not been rejected. The error happens when the sample 
estimate falls outside the confidence interval.  
Estimating a preference relation through a statistical test forces the existence of a type1 
error. When the researcher estimates multiple preference relations, he runs into multiple 
type1 errors. A series of pairwise relations extenuates the probability of a type1 error 
because all it takes is one pairwise relation to be rejected for an individual to be referred 
to as intransitive. When preferences are "weak" or when PrA(A,B)=½, it is more likely 
that an estimated cycle is in fact a Type1 error.  
In his overview of the literature on transitivities, Regenwetter et co reviewed over 20 
papers. Another common mistake researchers make is assume that transitivities are 
linear, that is they satisfy the triangle inequality. By forcing linearity, researchers force 
strong assumptions on preferences--linearity of preferences is a lot stronger than 
transitivity of preferences. By dropping the triangle inequality restriction, they discover 
that most instances of transitivity are over-reported.  
Finally, Regenwetter and co carried out a similar experiment with a few slight 
modifications. For one, the prizes of lotteries are now adjusted to 2011 price levels and 
the candidates are not pre-screened. In their experiment, they found that only 4 out of 
18 individuals violated transitivity and even that was within the margin of Type1 error. 
DISCRETE CHOICE MODEL 
It is said the rational individual makes a choice which she thinks will give her the highest 
utility among all available choices. In a choice set with two alternatives {i,j}, the 
individual will choose object i over object j if the utility of i is greater than utility of j, 
Ui>Uj. A discrete choice model is often used to describe this type of decision-making 
because of the discrete nature of the objects. Unlike regressions on continuous 
variables, a DCM is applicable here because the object set is finite and countable and 
because the outcomes are discrete (e.g. an individual chooses either object i or object j, 
she does not choose some fraction of the object).
A discrete choice model describes the relationship between the explained variables 
(e.g. some attributes) and the outcome. For a model to be effective, the three conditions 
have to be satisfied: the choice set has to be finite, the alternatives have to be 
exhaustive (e.g. all possible options have to be presented such that the individual can 
go through them and choose at least one) and the alternatives have to be mutually 
exclusive.  
Daniel McFadden was one of the main researchers to have made DCM's popular and is 
credited with much of the development of discrete choice models. In his original work on 
the San Francisco transit system (McFadden 1974) he used a discrete choice model to 
analyze individual's decisions to use various modes of transport such as car, train, 
carpooling and bus as well as the frequency of the transportation. His model would be 
able to predict the relationship between the observed variables and the outcomes. 
The utility accrued to an individual from choosing alternative i, Ui, is composed from an 
observed part (to the researcher) and an unobserved part. The former is some known 
attribute, for example the monetary cost of choosing an alternative. The unobserved part 
is everything else that isn't specified in the utility. Formally, utility is Ui = Vi + Ei where Vi 
is the observed part and Ei is the error term (unobserved) of object i. The decomposition 
is fully general in a sense that we say that Ui - Vi = Ei. 
The assumptions about the distribution of the error is crucial because it allows the 
researcher to specify a density function to estimate the otherwise hidden term. In the 
context of decision-making over discrete variables, the error in the utility, Ei, is assumed 
to follow an identically, independently, extreme value distribution if the assumptions 
above are satisfied.  
The difference between two error terms that have extreme value distribution, E*ij = Ei - 
Ej, is said to follow a logistic distribution. This has been proven by McFadden as part of 
his work on logit models. The assumption about the error term E*, also proven as part of 
his work, is the motivation for using a logit model such as the one that will be described 
in the next section. This paper will concentrate on the logit model which, according to 
Kenneth Train, is the most popular of the discrete choice models today (Train, 2009).
There exist other, more sophisticated, models in the family of logit models, such as 
nested-logit and the mixed logit models. As well, there are other models such as the 
multinomial and probit models--they are assumed to have a different error distribution, 
although the purpose thereof is essentially the same. These models are considered less 
rigid as they have slightly more relaxed assumptions on the errors, for example the 
absence of a correlation assumption among errors. Other class of models do not 
assume distribution of error at all; rather they estimate probability function with monte-
carlo simulation. They are usually employed in more sophisticated analysis which is 
beyond the scope of this paper.   
Logit
Originally developed and proved by McFadden in 1974, the logit model is the most 
popular of the family of discrete choice models. It is simple to understand and to use, 
has a known closed-form density and was referenced in the literature for decades.
Like all the class of discrete choice models, it deals with discrete outcomes. The 
purpose of the model is to relate some independent variables X to a discrete outcome Y. 
In a standard discrete choice model, the X would be the attributes of an object (1: the 
probability of winning a lottery and 2: the amount of the winning prize in dollars) and the 
Y would be the individual's choice from a two-choice set {i,j}. The coefficient on X is the 
likelihood (between 0,1) of impact by X on Y. 
The key component of the logit model is the hypothesis on the error distribution, which is 
said to be distributed logistically. Formally, Y = X + E* where E* is the error term. 
The density function of E*ij is :  
As been mentioned, it is possible to use this error distribution in the model when it 
assumed that the errors on alternatives (Ei, Ej) are identically, independently, 
distributed. That is, they are not correlated among themselves, corr(Ei,Ej)=0 for all i≠j, 
nor are they correlated with the independent variables X. 
Some researchers consider this assumption restrictive. After all, it is difficult to 
presuppose that the alternatives are not correlated. For example, some features about 
alternative A are also likely to appear in another alternative B. 
Kenneth Train explains that the assumption is not as restrictive as it seems at first. In 
fact, it follows directly from the construction of the discrete choice model itself. Recall 
the requirements of a discrete choice model is that the choice set is finite, the 
alternatives of the object set are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. If these conditions 
hold, then it is straightforward that there can be no correlation among errors. In other 
words, the errors are nothing but white noise. Thus, rather than a concern, it is actually a 
characteristic of a well-specified model. This paper will adopt Train's justification.
In a stochastic environment, the probability that object i is chosen in a set {i,j} is 
  ; or,
object i gets chosen if  = ½.
The probability function relating the probability that i is chosen among all alternatives j 
is:
  ; where Ui is the utility from alternative i and Uj is the utility from any 
alternative j in the choice set. 
The knowledge over probabilities can be used towards an empirical estimation, which 
the next section is going to discuss. The probabilities are going to be specified in a 
likelihood function. Then the negative of the likelihood function is going to be minimized 
by way of maximum likelihood estimation. Because the MLE is concerned with finding a 
maximum and because the point at which the maximum occurs does not change if the 
function is transformed monotonically, the likelihood function can be decomposed 
logarithmically into a log-likelihood. More of that in the next subsection. 
MODEL 1 & 2
Two discrete choice models were produced for the purpose of this paper. Both are 
based on the logit specification of the error terms. The first model is a true random utility 
model. The second model is a logit model with a context effect.
The models are constructed based on the theory of decision-making and the theory on 
probabilities. Then they are adapted so to be used for inference purposes in a stochastic 
environment. In other words, both Model 1 and Model 2 are empirical models: they are 
meant to analyze the data collected from the survey by Regenwetter and co-authors and 
produce estimates for the utilities of objects A,B,C,D, and E. Those estimates can then 
be used to answer some questions in the research on the theory of preference and 
transitivity. 
The models will examine the pairwise decisions of all the individuals. Recall an 
individual is asked to choose an alternative from 10 pairwise object sets. Each pairwise 
object set is asked 20 times, for a total of 200 questions per individual. Using the 
observations from all the pairwise relations, the empirical models will estimate the 
utilities for every object for every individual. 
The first model is a random utility model. A RUM assumes that the probability that an 
individual chooses an object i is completely random but has a known distribution. The 
second model assumes the probability of choosing an object is part random and partly 
depending on the choice set. The second model will test the hypothesis that an object 
set is important for individual decision. A discussion on both models will follow.
The models will be used to analyze a number of questions that were postulated in the 
research about choices and preferences. First, this paper will present some preference 
relations that were constructed based on the computed utilities. Second, the paper will 
analyze intransitivities given the constructed preference relations. Third, it will discuss 
several shortcomings of the models and possible improvements for future work. 
As well, there will be a discussion on what can be learned from the models and whether 
they explain the data very well and the forecasting capacity of the model. A section that 
deals with results will also talk about the likelihood score and the fit. The second model 
will answer questions regarding the context of the objects and the importance of the 
choice set; for example, whether introducing a variable that deals with the context 
improves the fit of the model.  
Model 1
This section will explain the motivation behind Model 1 and how it is applied empirically 
in order to estimate the utilities from data on individuals.  
Model 1 is random utility model. As the name implies, it assumes that utility from 
selecting an alternative i is random and depends on the distribution of the error term Ei, 
or Ui = Ei. In other words, an object i is chosen from a set {i,j} when Ei > Ej, or Ui > Uj. 
Now the probability that Ei > Ej is also an error term, E*ij. If the assumptions on E*ij, as 
outlined above hold, then it possible to use a logit model for estimation. 
The chief purpose behind Model 1 is to test the theory on preferences in a stochastic 
environment. That purpose is to run inference and to estimate the utility for all the 
objects in the master set {A,B,C,D,E}. Once the utilities are obtained, it follows that 
preferences can be constructed. Once preferences are constructed, there can be a 
discussion on cyclicities. 
The simplest and most obvious way is to rank the estimated utilities {UA,UB,UC,UD,UE) 
ordinally from lowest to highest. This method has its faults, as will be discussed in the 
section on Preferences, but it is a relevant exercise for the purpose of this paper. It is 
somewhat more sophisticated than simply looking at all the pairwise comparisons like 
Tversky did, and given the advances in random utility models, it is only appropriate that 
somebody finally did it. 
True to its name, the utility from the alternatives is assumed to depend on the error term. 
Some parametric assumptions are imposed on the error but otherwise there are no 
structural assumptions.  
Given the observations on the outcome (e.g. Nij), it is possible to use those 
observations to calculate what would be the estimated utility to individual possesses. 
We have seen that the probability that an object i is chosen in a pairwise comparison {i,j} 
is 
The probability that object j is chosen in a pairwise comparison {i,j} is
and Pi(i,j) + Pj(i,j) = 1 because non-choice or indifference is not allowed.
To run inference, it is necessary to combine all the possible pairwise comparisons and 
specify them in a likelihood function. There exists a total of ten pairwise comparisons, 
they are :(AB, AC, AD, AE, BC, BD, BE, CD, CE, DE) 
Putting them all together in a likelihood function would look like this:
where 
The exponent on top of each factor (e.g. Nab) denotes the amount of times that particular 
alternative has been chosen out of 20 times it was asked, and Nab + Nba = 20. The 
exponents are pulled directly from the results from the survey conducted by 
Regenwetter. 
The goal of this maximization is to find out the unknowns in the likelihood function, 
which are UA,UB,UC,UD and UE. The unknowns are found by solving for the maximum 
the likelihood function above. The procedure is known the Maximum likelihood 
estimation and it is a standard econometric procedure. 
The size of the coefficient UA (w.l.o.g) depends on two factors. First, it depends on 
whether A was chosen the majority of time when compared to the four alternatives 
B,C,D,E. Second, it depends on how frequently it was chosen in the four possible choice 
sets (A,B),(A,C),(A,D),(A,E). In other words, a high value of Nab, Nac, Nad, Nae will also 
imply a high value for coefficient UA, and the size of Nab, Nac, Nad, Nae reflects strong 
preferences towards alternative A.   
However, it is important to remember that the value of the coefficients is not important in 
itself, rather one has to compare it to other coefficients, including the normaliser which is 
set at 0. What's important is the difference between the coefficients and the normaliser. 
Model 2 
The second model is similar to the first in a sense that errors follow a logistic 
distribution. Its purpose is also to run inference on the data and estimate the coefficients 
for UA,UB,UC,UD,UE. However, Model 2 has the additional hypothesis that context 
matters in pairwise decisions so an inference exercise will also measure an additional 
variable alpha for significance.  
Context is said to matter if researchers suspect that the presence of an alternative j in a 
set {i,j} may influence an individual's decision making. The theory on LS preferences, for 
example, supposes that adjacent variables mislead an individual into choosing a less 
preferred alternative because of perception bias. 
Model 2 is not a true random utility model as there is another variable added to the utility 
of an object i, Ui = Ei + alphaij1X(j). The indicator function means that alpha equals some 
variable when j is in the choice set X={i,j} and 0 otherwise. Unlike Model 1, utility here 
does not solely depend on the error term, but also the object set X. 
The role of object set in decision making is an interesting topic and can be discussed 
with the additional hypothesis that context plays a role. To test the hypothesis, a 
variable alphaij is specified in the utility from object i, where alpha is some non-zero 
variable and j is the object in the choice set that said to matter (e.g. the presence of j is 
important). The motivation behind the hypothesis is the theory that adjacent objects may 
lead to perception bias and thus to cyclicities. This goes back to the theory of Tversky 
that individuals indifferent between the two objects based on the first attribute of the 
object will make the decision based on the second.  
If alphaij is significant then the hypothesis of context may be true. Furthermore, the new 
model will have a better fit to the data. So by including alphaij to control for the effect of 
context on decision making, it is possible to produce more powerful results and perhaps 
test some new ideas about the research. 
The first term of the Likelihood function, PA(A,B), now looks like this :
Of course, the variable alpha has to be normalized in terms of another variable for an 
interpretation to exist. So in the output, there will be information on 4 alphas and the 5th 
alpha is set to 0 by the researcher. The 4 alphas will be interpreted in terms of the 
normalized-alpha.
The only caveat with adding more variables to the model is that the likelihood score 
cannot decrease. In fact, it will increase even when the impact of the new variable is 
very small. The expanded model can appear like a better fit then the unadjusted model 
even though it is not necessary the case. In this situation, it is necessary to use caution 
and perform a fit test such as the Wald test. The difference in estimation between the 
two models is a good topic for discussion and will be dealt with in the section on results. 
Estimation
All values are computed with a program that was coded in R (see appendix D). The log-
likelihood function was entered once as seen above, then it was looped over for each of 
the 18 respondents. Using MLE estimation procedure as composed in one of the R 
packages, the negative of the LL function was minimized for each respondent.  The 
variables that came in the output are the utilities for A,B,C,D and E. For Model 2, the log 
likelihood function of the model was modified to allow for an expanded model. The 
expanded model would test whether the presence of certain alternatives was significant 
for an individual making his choice. More about that in the next section. 
Not least, the important thing about the model is a good fit. A model with a high LL score 
is said to fit the data well. 
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
This section will analyze the results that were obtained from maximizing the log-
likelihood functions. The input is the data collected from the survey by Regenwetter and 
co-authors and the output are the estimated utilities for objects A,B,C,D and E. The 
results are tabulated in a 18*5 matrix where the rows are respondents and the columns 
are utilities for individual objects (Appendix A). The first column is the utility from 
choosing object A, it is normalized at 0 for all respondents. The next four columns are 
the calculated utility from choosing objects B, C, D, and E respectively. These utilities 
are interpreted relative to the normaliser which is set to equal 0; so an object with utility 
20 is a lot more favourable than an object with utility at 10 and both are more favourable 
than the normaliser which is 0. An object with a negative estimated utility is said to be 
less favourable than the normaliser. The last column is the log likelihood score, which is 
the indication of the fit of the likelihood function. 
Recall that the size of the computed utility reflects the choices of individuals from 
pairwise comparison. Both the choice frequency (e.g Nab) and the fact that A was 
chosen the majority of time in a set (A,B),(A,C),(A,D),(A,E) impact the coefficient. This 
section of analysis will not deal with the 4 individuals whose utility was impossible to 
calculate because they behaved in a deterministic manner, which lead to convergence 
problems. The interpretation will focus on the 14 individuals that remain. Convergence 
problems will be discussed in a section about convergence.
Preference relations
A preference relation can be constructed based on some observations of individual 
decision making. In this example, we have observations on pairwise decisions and the 
objects as calculated from the maximum likelihood function. The latter are ordinal 
numbers so it is possible to rank them from highest to lowest. Ranking the master set 
{A,B,C,D,E} based on estimated utilities {UA,UB,UC,UD,UE} is one way of constructing 
a preference relation. Theory says it is wrong to aggregate preference draws like that. 
Further criticism by Regenwetter exposes the faults with assuming all preference draws 
belong to one preference relationship.
Suppose however a researcher was aggregate preferences and rank the master set 
from the most preferred to the least. This paper will go ahead and do exactly that and 
then discuss some possible lessons from constructing such a preference relation, as 
well as comparing this preference relation to preferences observed from watching 
individual's choices in a two-object choice-set. 
Recall that each object A,B,C,D,E is a lottery with two attributes, 1) the probability of 
winning the lottery 2) and the prize of the lottery. The first attribute is lowest for object A 
and increases for B,C,D,E. The second attribute is lowest for object E and increases for 
objects D,C,B,A. Thus, it is expected that respondents' preferences would mimic the first 
of the second attribute. For example, an individual who is strictly concerned for the first 
attribute will probably have a preference relation (A>B>C>D>E) over the master set. 
Looking at the results (Appendix B), one can see a wide variation of tastes from 
respondent to respondent but there are a few patterns that stand out. Indeed, it appears 
most respondents base their preferences on one of the two attributes. The large majority 
seem to base their opinion on probability of winning attribute which is highest for object 
E and then gradually decreases for objects D,C,B and A. Of the 14 respondents that are 
relevant for the analysis, 11 claim E as their most preferred object. The most common 
preference relation over the master set is {E>D>C>B>A} but there exist other variations 
such as {E>C>D>B>A} and {E>D>B>C>A}. Only one respondent based her preferences 
on the value of prize attribute, which is highest for A and decreasing for B,C,D, and E. 
This respondent expressed  A>B>C>D>E as a preference relation. 
Theory, of course, says that this is not an accurate representation of an individual's 
tastes. Because each draw is random and can belong to any transitive state, it is 
incorrect to aggregate them as aggregation leads to cycles. The correct way would be to 
deal with each separately; or better yet, discover a way to unveil an individual's 
transitive state. Unfortunately, there is no known empirical model that can do that. 
Cyclicit ies
A cyclicity in preferences is said to occur when the axiom of transitivity is violated. 
Tversky assumed that every cyclicity is proof that transitivity is violated. However, it is 
possible that cyclicities occur without the axiom of transitivity being violated. This 
section will discuss why cases of cyclicities are overestimated in literature on 
preferences and transitivity. It will also point out "divergences" between preferences 
constructed over a master set and preferences observed in a pairwise comparison. 
These divergences can sometimes be mistaken for cyclicities but really this is a special 
case of difference in preferences.  
A lot of literature about preferences and transitivity, as reviewed by Regenwetter, finds 
cases of cyclicities. Many researchers like Tversky assume that observed cases of 
cyclicity in preferences imply a violation of the axiom of transitivity. Regenwetter argues 
that it is not necessarily the case. Here are a few remarks on why cases of observed in 
cyclicity do not necessarily violate the axiom of transitivity.  
First, most cases of transitivity are due to the inability of a model to reconcile stochastic 
transitivity with deterministic transitivity. Recall that the axiom on transitivity is defined in 
a deterministic context whereas observed cyclicity happens in a stochastic environment. 
Second, there is a problem with the assumptions that preferences are linear. If a three-
way preference relation is not required to satisfy a triangle inequality, the linearity 
assumption on preferences is forced. 
Third, the existence of Type1 errors. As there are multiple draws and thus multiple 
potential preference relations, accordingly there must be multiple Type1 errors. This 
increases the probability that a case of false transitivity fails to be rejected following a 
significance test. 
These errors are notorious in the literature on transitivity. The two last remarks are 
possible to deal with and Regenwetter instructs just how in his paper. The first problem, 
however, remains so far unresolved. 
A "divergence" (for lack of a better word) is said to occur when preferences over a 
master set do not correspond with one of the preferences expressed under a pairwise 
comparison. For example, if an individual is assumed to have a preference over a 
master set as (A>B>C>D>E) but then in a pairwise comparison, she chose B over A, 
thus B>A, it is said that pairwise preferences diverge from the preferences in the master 
set. As been pointed out in the previous subsection, the preferences constructed over 
the master set are not accurate for a host of reasons. Nevertheless, the paper will 
proceed with this exercise. The results are tabulated in Appendix B. 
As seen in the Appendix B, six out of fourteen respondents had the same preferences in 
the two-choice set as in the five-choice set. There would be a 7th if we counted weakly 
preferred objects. The remaining 7 out of 14 individuals were found to have divergences 
between the two-choice set and the five-choice set. The seven had as many as 2-4 
"divergences" each in the preferences.
Another possible cause for violating transitivity may be due to bad survey design. While 
the people responsible for surveying made sure that the questions are separated by 
filler questions to ensure statistical independency between relevant questions, the order 
of these questions is not investigated. If the way the questions are posed is not 
orthogonal, it may create some statistical dependencies or correlation among errors that 
will bias the estimated results. Furthermore, the order in which the objects are presented 
matters. Individuals may succumb to perception effects and to cognitive biases when 
choosing between two alternatives, they will commit errors that otherwise should not 
happen. These effects may create just enough of a problem to bias results.
As well, some respondents may not choose to reveal their true preferences for any 
unknown reason. The selections they are making can be in fact some bogus choices 
that do not reflect their true tastes. Some advanced methods in experimental design can 
control for or at least mitigate this type of behaviour. Yet the researchers on preferences 
and choice do not discuss employing any such techniques. More information about 
experimental design is discussed in the section about "Future work". 
Lastly, another potential cause for violation in transitivity is the role of context. It is 
hypothesised that the choice of the choice-set may be important for an individual's 
decision because some objects may stand out in the presence of another object. For 
example, given the presence of j, the respondent will be more likely to choose object i. 
This kind of preference relationship is not implausible and if it occurs, it could lead to an 
intransitive choice relation. Perhaps some of the violations of intransitivity are due to 
exactly this type of effect. To determine if this is indeed possible, a new model will be 
used to estimate exactly this type of relationship. This model will be called Model 2 and 
the results are covered in the next subsection. 
Model extensions
The random utility model, Model 1, is very flexible and easily adaptable to a number of 
situations. Due to time limitations, only one adaption was made possible and that is 
Model 2. However, here is but one idea that could be implemented for future work. 
It would be interesting to include an observed variable "expected-value" in the model. 
On one hand, a pure random utility model has a lot of flexibility in a sense that it can 
estimate preferences without any structural presupposition on the relations, which is 
always desirable. On the other hand, it is known by the researcher that the five objects 
are not equal. If the researcher has information on the objects, which are the two 
attributes, he should specify this information in the model. Perhaps if this information 
was embedded under and an observed variable E(i), where E(i) is the expectations 
operator (e.g. E(i) = expected value of lottery i), the explanatory power of the model 
would increase and it would reveal more interesting results. By including this kind of 
variable in the utility, the researcher can control for the observed factors. This kind of 
tinkering could improve the statistical power of the model and could produce different 
preference relations. Then it would be possible to compare the new preference relations 
to current one (as produced under Model 1) and see how the number of cyclicities 
changes. As the expected values are numeric and hence transitive, it would imply less 
transitivities.  
Results from model 2
The results from model 2 are tabulated in Appendix C. The results are by and large 
insignificant and irrelevant. In other words, Model 2 does not work. It is not clear why it is 
the case. The code appears to be okay and the alpha variable is well specified in the 
likelihood function. However, the results come off as bizarre. For one, there is a problem 
for each alternative j specified (j=B,C,D,E) and regardless of which default values the 
parameters are set. Two, the cause for the non-work appears to be a conversion 
problem. The optimizer is unable to converge for nearly every single respondent. It's 
bizarre because the only modification to the model is an added variable alpha. It's not 
like the likelihood function has gone from convex to concave. Therefore, it is not clear 
why the optimizer is not converging. Maybe multicollinearity is a problem or there exist 
some other problems not understood by the researcher.
If the model 2 had worked, the output would have been interpreted in the following way. 
The total utility Ti from the object i equals utility Ui plus the term alphaij when object j is 
present in the choice set or simply Ui when it is not present. Formally, Ti = Ui + alphaij 
when j is present or Ti = Ui when it is not present. If alpha is significant and different 
from zero, it is said that the presence of alternative j matters for a decision-making 
respondent. 
Unfortunately the results here are wholly insignificant so this type of output cannot be 
used nor interpreted. This paper cannot say very much about the role of context for a 
decision-making respondent. 
Convergence and problems
The only problem with the code is the issue of convergence. Four out of 18 respondents, 
they are respondent #3,8,11 and 14, exhibited absolute (or almost) consistence in their 
preference, which is to say they behaved deterministically (e.g. they made the same 
choice 20 out of 20 times they were presented the choice). Formally, the probability that 
the individual chooses i in a set of {i,j} equals 1 (or almost). Because of that, the 
optimizer is unable to converge to a good estimator of the utility. Therefore, these four 
cases were dropped from the previous portion of the analysis. Also, the log likelihood 
score is very low for each and one of these four respondents. This confirms that this 
type of model is unable to adequately measure a case of WST where choices are very 
consistent. 
FUTURE WORK
The following design can be incorporated in the research on preferences. A good design 
will strongly increase the statistical significance of the model and allow for better 
interpretation of the results. Unfortunately, applying the design to the model was 
impossible as it would require to conduct a new survey, which is beyond the scope of 
this work. 
Properties
The following design is embedded with three properties: column balance, adjacency 
property and maximum row difference. Each property satisfies a particular concern in 
surveying. A formal definition and explanation of the three properties here follow.  
Column balance. The elements A,B,C,D,E are said to be balanced when they each 
appear an equal number of times on the every column (except for column 5). 
This property is desirable because it protects against respondents who choose any 
column without concern for the element. These respondents only care about completing 
the survey and not giving any truthful information. For example, there may be 
respondents who always choose the first column. The column balance property ensures 
that this type of response does not bias the answers collected from other respondents. 
Adjacency property. A is said to be adjacent to B when the two appear together on the 
same row without space in between them (consider AB as a pair where A is adjacent to 
B).  A row of three elements has 2 adjacent pairs; a row of n elements has n-1 adjacent 
pairs. The adjacency property ensures that every element is adjacent to another an 
equal amount of times. 
This property addresses the concern that the position of A relative to other elements on 
the row may be important. For example, if A is a special choice then it might be more 
visually enticing if it appeared adjacent to B than if it appears adjacent to C (e.g  A 
belongs to ABC is preferred to A belongs to ACB).
In this 26 choice set, there are 49 pairs of elements of which 10 are unique. Thus, my 
design construction ensures that 9 unique pairs appear five times and 1 unique pair 
appears four times, which is the optimal construction with respect to adjacency property. 
Maximum row difference.  Two consecutive rows are said to have maximum difference 
between them when there is the least number of repeated elements. For example, row 
AB is said to have the most distance from row CD or row DE because no element is 
repeated twice. Any two rows of three elements each will have at least one repeat 
between them. What this property does is ensure there is the least number of repeats 
possible over the entire 26 row matrix. 
This property does not guarantee independence between all rows nor does it maximize 
distance between rows further apart like in a construction under modulo algebra. 
However, it does ensure no obvious pattern can be observed as far as the respondent 
can tell and this should be enough for most purposes. 
The reason row independence is desirable is so that we can say that a choice made by 
the respondent in one row does not influence a choice in another row. This is useful but 
it removes concerns that a sequence of rows where element A is repeated (e.g. AB, AC, 
AD) will have a particular effect on a choice due to the repeated presence of A. For 
example, if A>B>C>D but the three rows AB, AC, AD follow one another then it’s more 
likely that an intransitivity will happen, especially if the difference between the elements 
are not really large. This type of effect is undesirable and so making the rows different 
from one another is one way to avoid it. 
Design
26-SET ORDERED
CE
AB
CD
EA
BD
AC
DE
BC
DA
EB
DCA
EBD
CAE
CDB
BEA
DEC
BAD
ECB
ADE
ABC
DAEB
EBAC
ACBD
BDCE
CEDA
CDEAB
 
 
0 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
CONCLUSION
This paper is both an overview of the theory on choices and transitivity and an applied 
exercise in choice modelling. I did my best to cover a bit of everything that relates to the 
topic in terms of conceptual framework and econometric theory alike, as well as build 
the model and then run inference on the data. However, as the subject is very 
expansive, an extensive overview was impossible. More research is required to further 
develop the original model which would allow to test additional hypothesis about role of 
context in preferences.  
In the section about Future work, I incorporated work on Experimental design that was 
done independently of the work about Preferences. The two are in fact related but this 
connection was not sought in this paper. In the future, the work on experimental design 
could improve statistical methods and increase the explicative power of a survey. 
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Appendix A
Results from Model 1 where defaults =0
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 minusll
respondent 1 0 0.497227 1.226903 1.13594 2.17501
-
113.04
respondent 2 0 -1.28412 -1.49559 -3.00524 -2.88548 -92.51
respondent 3 0 2.991635 5.989139 16.78015 27.85805 -7.99
respondent 4 0 -0.23005 -0.27657 -0.04581 2.064633
-
108.59
respondent 5 0 1.693105 3.106339 6.374661 9.371804 -30.7
respondent 6 0 0.448292 0.867551 1.935436 3.22275 -91.52
respondent 7 0 1.16726 2.050719 3.160408 4.829418 -68.55
respondent 8 0 1.793591 4.904423 15.96364 27.30741 -12.59
respondent 9 0 0.293671 0.252259 0.500026 1.055907
-
131.36
respondent 10 0 2.469335 4.096593 5.472402 6.554283 -49.22
respondent 
11 0 3.107015 5.015965 7.383362 18.27072 -19.42
respondent 12 0 0.440738 0.311293 0.783581 1.570908
-
123.46
respondent 13 0 -0.13619 0.349286 1.186854 1.001603
-
123.44
respondent 
14 0 -2.94422 -14.4266 -25.8081 -28.7525 -7.94
respondent 15 0 0.865325 1.434535 1.861776 2.485558
-
106.76
respondent 16 0 0.757396 1.545379 2.353768 3.98601 -81.12
respondent 17 0 0.201585 0.080511 0.161142 -0.24334 -137.1
respondent 18 0 0.576829 1.234083 1.411349 1.593811 -120.5
in bold : convergence problem
Appendix B
Preference relation from model 1
1st most 
preferred
2nd 
preferred
3d 
preferred
4th 
preferred
5th 
preferred cyclicities
respondent1 E C D B A ab,bc
respondent2 A B C E D de
respondent3       NA
respondent4 E A B C D da,db
respondent5 E D C B A none
respondent6 E D C B A ab,cb,cd
respondent7 E D C B A none
respondent8       NA
respondent9 E D B C A none
respondent1
0 E D C B A none
respondent11     NA
respondent1
2 E D B C A ab,cd,de
respondent1
3 D E C A B ac,ce
respondent14     NA
respondent1
5 E D C B A none
respondent1
6 E D C B A none
respondent1
7 B D C A E
ab,ac,bd,c
d
respondent1
8 E D C B A ce,de
in bold: weak cyclicities
Appendix C
Results from Model 2 with alphaij set to 2,3,4
Model with alphaij (j=3) and default values=0 
u
1
u2 u3 u4 u5 alpha23 alpha43 alpha53 minus
ll
0 -
12.299675
1.3862
3
-
11.091
1
-
10.806499
25.7404
9
24.5026
6
24.4704
7
-10.01
0 -13.215245  -1.734595 -13.282807 -13.383981  25.069441  20.305387 
23.516747 
-8.46
0 -10.24108  13.66828  12.11286  14.20847  34.56924  16.12503  14.20847 0
0 -11.7880719  -0.6169764 -12.4097968 -10.8584259  23.9189634 
24.0867578  22.7690304
-12.95
0 -10.001858   2.197183  -8.953580   3.492629  24.106522  22.866268 
11.745003 
-6.5
0 -11.159763   1.098542  -9.790303  -8.702415  23.932194  22.417021 
21.749657 
-11.25
0 -10.709997   2.197223 -10.318629 -10.044813  24.904109  25.473991 
23.894816 
-6.5
0 -11.57530  12.54525  11.64357  13.48811  33.26037  15.03685  13.48811 0
0 -10.5497806   0.6190934 -12.2156831 -10.4817098  23.1035265 
25.8922417  23.1070040 
-12.95
0 -9.1330412 11.3700930  0.8179845 -9.0907837 31.9752838 24.1997544 0
33.7390290 
0 -8.533126 11.036553  1.570672 12.141128 30.046337 22.157540 
12.141128 
0
0 -12.0306243   0.4054924 -12.6669706 -12.0986266  25.9204204 
26.5460719  25.7469813 
-13.46
0 -11.8228115  -0.2006261 -10.8629975 -11.0544628  23.7053458 
22.7230658  24.0754534 
-13.76
0 -15.72543 -13.85589 -29.49816 -29.43398  28.40255  16.28202  13.55820 0
0 -10.707084   1.098575 -10.152428 -10.582912  23.677744  23.041651 
23.556548 
-11.25
0  -3.236855  13.075113 -18.845099 -14.141993  27.222089  48.282894 
48.550763 
0
0 -1.139719e+01  1.887526e-05 -1.675694e+01 -1.198909e+01 
3.223147e+01  3.152129e+01  2.436602e+01 
-13.86
0 -11.548390   1.386253 -11.389145 -10.369588  24.389658  24.892349 
23.866105 
-10.01
model with alphaij (j=3) and default values for 
alphas = 30
u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 alpha23 alpha43 alpha53 minusll
0 -14.13722   1.38630 -10.99621 -14.94810  30.00006  30.00034 
30.04096 
-10.01
0 -18.288939  -1.734541 -14.514986 -13.205331  30.000214  30.000048 
30.000080
-8.45
0 -12.762429  15.256480   1.259213   1.259208  41.218825  31.259207 
31.259178
0
0 -10.884745  -0.618506 -11.129172 -15.817951  30.000000  30.000000 
30.000039
-12.95
0 -14.210719566   2.197214332 -14.311197838  -0.002348369 -6.5
30.000194089 30.470052385  30.000000540
0 -10.372683   1.098744 -14.282358 -13.580995  30.000001  30.000015 
30.000010
-11.25
0 -14.693621   2.197209 -14.583562 -14.500355  30.000348  30.993196 
30.812805
-6.5
0 -16.392245  18.035884   3.499634   3.499682  50.752052  33.499546 
33.499506
0
0 -12.226076   0.619088 -11.386810 -10.692682  30.000002  30.000001 
30.000000
-12.95
0 -11.775998  14.139015  -1.116731 -11.614333  38.674542  30.908477 
40.534181
0
0 -13.0281325  15.9023707   0.3113298   1.5726806  43.3008191 
32.3913927 31.5726688
0
0 -10.5227853   0.4053481 -10.9034079 -16.1753537  30.0000006 
30.0000005 30.0000757
-13.46
0 -16.0433521  -0.2006654 -17.2069636 -17.0252322  30.0001547 
30.5579618 30.3313581
-13.76
0 -17.17462 -17.78830 -36.48953 -36.48957  33.27516  30.00001 
30.00000
0
0 -13.898017   1.098614 -12.279278 -14.351496  30.000035  30.001904 
30.020808
-11.25
0  -3.538448  14.114883 -13.564942 -13.681554  36.264602  42.297078 
42.590917
0
0 -1.154697e+01  4.752177e-05 -1.244494e+01 -1.180372e+01 
3.000000e+01 3.000000e+01  3.000000e+01
-13.86
0 -13.86636   1.38630 -11.64638 -12.69446  30.00004  30.00106 
30.00306
-10.01
Model with alphaij (j=2) and all default 
values=0
u1 u2 u3 u4 u4 alpha32 alpha42 alpha52 minusll
0  -0.2006768 -12.3545588 -11.4878631 -10.5661190  24.1120907 
23.5737003  22.1901692
-13.76
0 -1.734547 -12.982763 -13.699682 -14.333734  25.367850  22.685082 
24.571523
-8.45
0 2.944448 -10.170905   6.952230  10.224162  27.113320  10.355430 
10.224162 
-3.97
0  -2.197151 -14.442191 -13.943415 -12.315449  28.209720  27.932010 
25.922309 
-6.5
0  2.944329 -9.438684 -9.275966  7.149244 24.506333 25.800443 
16.372641
-3.97
0  -0.200675 -11.062810  -9.918823  -1.715243  23.172402  22.521371 
15.213558
-13.76
0   2.194198  -9.491577 -10.389325  -9.861736  24.362986  24.480343 
24.207493
-6.5
0  1.735157 -5.991030  5.770262  9.758268 20.650922  9.507326 
9.758268
-8.45
0   0.6191649 -11.1625175 -12.3678362 -11.4665702  23.9354299 
26.0049144 23.2083692 
-12.95
0  2.954177 -7.074463  2.760887 -8.980566 21.994452 13.089183 
24.399352 
-3.97
0  2.944696 -6.507094  4.274082  9.189304 22.824941 11.508597 
9.189304
-3.97
0 -3.070476e-05 -1.311004e+01 -1.236514e+01 -1.096421e+01 
2.870100e+01 2.613006e+01  2.524358e+01
-13.86
0  1.253683e-05 -1.087681e+01 -1.389536e+01 -1.331490e+01 
2.971582e+01 2.615087e+01  2.607002e+01
-13.86
0  -2.944403 -15.220222 -16.716072 -16.657971  12.718997  12.402543 
9.536919
-3.97
0   1.098608 -16.709579 -15.245740 -12.276680  32.311125  30.127119 
30.106929 
-11.25
0  13.7464602   0.6776522 -13.8657996 -13.4135123  28.9202046 
42.6402859 42.2208245
0
0  -0.6177744 -11.4963194 -10.8714402 -10.9592872  25.1496083 
26.3746230 20.3995736
-12.95
0   0.4054679 -14.0295017 -12.9723529 -13.6655091  29.9895495 
29.4485696 29.9388458
-13.46
Model with alphaij (j=4) and all default values = 
0
u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 alpha24 alpha34 alpha54 minusll
0 -11.368183 -10.320213   2.188574  -9.985138  25.065024  24.472988 
24.710586 
-6.5
0 -22.25237 -21.00032 -11.85512 -22.76949  33.60893  32.40999 
35.84745 
0
0 -11.727045  -0.997094  16.300626  16.177358  26.120137  16.740444 
16.177358 
0
0 -15.732542 -15.291607   1.386249 -12.915910  31.156325  30.401770 
29.012993
-10.01
0 -10.033194  -9.969554   2.948316  -6.431484  21.975624  22.077021 
21.512905 
-3.97
0 -11.820078 -11.002443   2.944327  -7.919132  24.928928  25.568097 
24.272571 
-3.97
0 -10.962487  -9.979390   1.734408  -9.502147  23.038214  22.767425 
22.916459
-8.46
0 -12.9582132  -0.6536567  15.6169238  15.7697749  27.3033795 
17.6604930  15.7697749
0
-11.2066884 -10.7778116   0.4054029 -11.6573427  23.3262700 
22.3657844  24.4759815
-13.46
0 -11.53241928  -0.03047561  12.70252708 -11.40338958 
26.95437448  26.31510933 36.86051351
0
0 -12.296382   1.034364  16.368410  16.795217  28.728693  29.100567 
16.795217
0
0 -13.953359 -19.633945   1.098592 -13.299253  31.342070  36.168503 
28.309578
-11.25
0 -12.170371 -11.886396   1.098529 -11.507440  25.173768  23.446626 
23.899186
-11.25
0 -12.90632 -12.90788 -13.30921 -24.97632  23.27467  13.70262 
22.38270
0
0 -12.022433 -10.477327   2.197286  -9.834735  25.453040  23.909246 
23.960211
-6.5
0 -10.495018 -10.533398   0.847419  -9.926949  22.452117  22.491239 
24.060394
-12.22
0 -16.2398094 -11.8746260   0.4054993 -11.7617446  31.2250079 
29.0780834  23.5798409
-13.46
0 -10.623554 -12.157278   1.098681 -10.805018  23.453706  26.068141 
24.642292
-11.25
Appendix D
R code for Model 1
library(bbmle)
llf <- function(u2=0,u3=0,u4=0,u5=0){
  u <- c(0,u2,u3,u4,u5)
  ll <- 0
  for (i in 1:5){
    for (j in 1:5){
      ll <- ll + respondentx[i,j] * (u[i]) - respondentx[i,j] * log(exp(u[i]) + exp(u[j]))
    }
  }
  -ll
}
for (k in 1:18){
  respondentx <- read.csv(paste("respondentx",k,".txt",sep=""), header=TRUE)
  results <- mle2(llf, method = "BFGS")
  print(results)
}
Appendix E
R code for Model 2
library(bbmle)
llf <- function(u2=0,u3=0,u4=0,u5=0,
                alpha23=0,alpha43=0,alpha53=0){
  alpha = matrix(0, nrow = 5, ncol = 5)
  alpha[, 3] <- c(0, alpha23, 0, alpha43, alpha53)
  u <- c(0,u2,u3,u4,u5)
  ll <- 0
  for (i in 1:5){
    for (j in 1:5){
      ll <- ll + respondentx[i,j] * (u[i]+(alpha[i,3])) - respondentx[i,j] * log(exp(u[i]+
(alpha[i,3])) + exp(u[j]))
    }
  }
  -ll
}
for (k in 1:18){
  respondentx <- read.csv(paste("respondentx",k,".txt",sep=""), header=TRUE)
  results <- mle2(llf, method = "BFGS")
  print(results)
}

